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Mr. Yehuda Weinstein
The Attorney General
Ministry of Justice
Jerusalem

Dear Sir,

Re: Failure to comply with interim decisions of the courts and with commitments and undertakings made by the state concerning court rulings

Ref. Your reply 231-0004-2001, dated 23 February 2011

1. Thank you for your reply to my letter dated 2 September 2010. While I share in your hope, as expressed in your letter, that your Directive no. 6.1006 may bring about a shift in the attitude of governmental ministries towards court rulings, I wish to share with you my concern that you may not have addressed a lacuna in that directive, one that I pointed out in my aforementioned letter. It concerns the fact that the directive addresses only compliance with rulings; it does not address the obligation to honour interim decisions of the courts, or the duty to honour commitments that the state makes through its representatives in the course of adjudication, declarations that the court draws on in rendering its rulings. The matter concerns undertakings made on behalf of the Attorney General's Office, in the name of the state, to do something or to act according to a certain policy. They are generally aimed at postponing a court decision or obtaining a further period of time to implement something, or to postpone the issuance of a mandatory injunction or a contempt order against the state.

   That obligation to comply must also be addressed explicitly in the directive, although – like the obligation of complying with rulings – it is deemed to be an extension thereof. Violation of interim orders of the court that are not rulings, and of governmental commitments or undertakings made before the court, is no less harmful to the rule of law than the harm caused by non-compliance with a ruling.

2. I concluded the letter which I sent you on 2 September 2010 with the following words, which I believe are worth repeating, since they constitute the subject of the present letter. This is what I wrote on the matter of the Derech Avot outpost:

   > "... I wish to draw your attention to the perturbing statements made by the Supreme Court Justices in HCJ [High Court of Justice] 8255/08, in their ruling on the matter of **Ali Muhammad Issa Moussa v. The Minister of Defence et al.**, a ruling that was rendered very recently (on 1 September 2010).

The matter concerns demolition orders issued by the Civil Administration against buildings that were constructed without permits and unlawfully (in the Derech Avot outpost). Petitions filed in this matter in 2004 were withdrawn following the state's undertaking to set up a professional governmental panel to investigate ownership of the land under dispute. According to the court, the panel – though it was set up – never concluded its activity. In 2008, when it became clear that construction was continuing, another petition was filed, which was also withdrawn following the government's announcement that it would act swiftly to demolish the building, and that it would grant the issue the highest priority (ruling dated 29 April 2008). Another petition, which was filed some months later since the building had not yet been demolished, was also withdrawn following the state's undertaking to implement its obligation without delay (dated 18 May 2009). Despite this dual undertaking, the building was not demolished and a further petition was filed, following which the state informed the court (some five years after its initial undertaking) that it did not intend to enforce the law, since the priorities concerning the supervision of buildings had changed, and the state had more urgent tasks to attend to. The state also advised the court that it was a matter of policy, for the government's discretion, and thus that there was no basis for replacing it with a judicial decision. Regarding the work of the panel appointed to perform the land-ownership survey (in compliance with its commitment of 2004), the state announced that a timetable for carrying out the examination could not be set because it required budgetary resources and time, and the implications for security and policy would have to be examined. Six years were insufficient for the state to uncover the foundations for the claim of trespass, and the four years that elapsed did not help it to place the structure's demolition on the agenda of its enforcement priorities.

Of this the court remarked, inter alia (Justice E. Levy):

> '... the state declared several years ago that it intended to provide an answer to this question, at least from the moment that the previous appeals were heard on the same subject. All I can say about those declarations is that there are grounds for concern that they do not comply with the judicial process during which they were given, and in which the reservations of respondents 1-4 were dismissed because they undertook to conclude the examination quickly. Nonetheless, the state is once again appearing before this court, and it now disagrees with statements previously made by its representatives. Although it once again makes its opinion heard that the land-survey is necessary, and moreover, it has even been 'decided to advance it', no one knows when it will be performed, and 'there's plenty of time'... We expect the state to abide by the declarations it reiterates to us, even if no order absolute was involved in the matter...'

Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition, as it saw no reason to intervene in the priorities of the state, and it left the embarrassing result unchanged, so that the demolition orders issued by the state over six years ago, that it already undertook to implement in 2008, were never implemented... which merits only mortification and anger.

Any further discussion of the above is superfluous.

To prepare in advance for properly implementing your new directive, in good faith and with a willing mind, it would be appropriate to first carry out a thorough review (possibly by creating a database) concerning the whole range of declarations and undertakings that the state has made before the High Court of Justice and which remain unfulfilled (including the state's as-yet unfulfilled undertaking to develop a procedure for including of women in public committees, an omission arising from the ruling in HCJ 5660/10, dated 22 August 2010), to draw the required conclusions and conduct a comprehensive reorganization of systems – both substantive and value-based – in this sphere. Only then, it seems to me, can the regular activity of the new directive begin."

3. In my afore-cited letter, I related to the issue in a rather summary fashion, but since matters have not, to my regret, received the attention they merit, I would like to set out before you some other examples of cases in which interim rulings of the court, or commitments and undertakings that a state representative made to the court, were not implemented.

   From the remarks and reprimands made by the court, it is obvious that the courts (particularly the High Court of Justice) view this conduct as particularly disturbing. In my opinion, it makes no difference whether the accumulation of cases that are listed herein is defined as a phenomenon, or if these cases may be defined as "one case too many'" as a result of which the court found it necessary to address them seriously. What is certain is that this is not a matter of exceptional, unusual cases; rather, it requires that you issue directives and detailed procedures relating explicitly to the obligation of compliance with them.

4. In my memorandum on non-compliance with rulings given against the state, I listed several incidents that illustrate the state's conduct, which involves its failure to comply with the commitments and presentations that it made or presented before the court. I wish to make clear that I do not intend to recycle what I wrote in the memorandum (although I repeat and emphasise that, to date, most of the rulings cited in therein have not been complied with). The focus in this letter is non-compliance with commitments and declarations that were made before the courts during adjudication and before a ruling, or thereafter, and that were not complied with. In my opinion, these cases suffice to justify re-examination of your directive. However, but I view it my duty to bring additional examples that were not cited in the aforementioned memorandum, because they occurred or were brought to my attention after it was written. I have collected the cases with the generous help of Advocate Dan Yakir from the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Advocate Michael Sfard of the Yesh Din Association, and Advocate Sawan Zaher of Adalah.

5. Details of the cases follow (the first four are taken from my memorandum on non-compliance):

   1) In **HCJ 11163/03**, in the matter of **The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens in Israel v. The Prime Minister**, **t**he court, at the request of the state, granted several extensions for the implementation of the ruling. It

was possible to understand – and indeed the court did understand – that by the end of the extension, the state would act in organisational and budgetary terms to uphold its undertaking to implement the ruling, since the extension was sought for that purpose. However, the deadlines of the extensions that the court granted elapsed, and between one extension and the next the state made no progress. The date set for the final extension was 1 September 2009. Years have passed and yet the court's ruling remains unimplemented (this time under the aegis of the Economic Arrangements Law for the period 2009-2010. The law extended governmental decisions that had been approved prior to the law until January 2012. In June 2010, Adalah petitioned for the revocation of the aforementioned clause, arguing that the validity of a decision that has been overturned by the High Court of Justice cannot be extended. The petition was rejected after the court accepted the state's argument that the section of the law does not apply to a decision that was cancelled, and the state does not use such a decision for the purposes of classification and allocating benefits. Whatever the case, the list of Arab localities in the north according to the state's new decision – #1060, issued in December 2010 – has not yet been published, and Arab localities in the north have yet to be classified [as "National Priority Areas"] or obtain benefits).

2) In HCJ 7562/09, **Fatma Abu Sbeileh v. The Ministry of Education** [brought by Adalah], the Minister of Education's commitment to the court that a high school would be built in the area of the village of Abu Tulul in the Negev [Naqab] by 1 September 2009, has still not been fulfilled. (On the need for the construction of the school, see the aforementioned memorandum of non-compliance with rulings.) The state conditioned the upholding of its undertaking on the termination of planning processes, processes that are liable to continue for years. In the state's response, which was recently given to the High Court of Justice, the state did not cite a timeframe for the end of planning processes, and it is therefore unclear when the school will be built.

3) In **HCJ 4542/02, Kav La'Oved v. The Government of Israel**, on the question of binding migrant workers to their original employers, the government undertook before the court to draw up, within a given period of time, alternative arrangements for the policy of binding migrant workers, and presented to the court – consistently and as conclusive fact – its intention to formulate and implement employment arrangements for various types of employment. Retrospectively, it became clear that it was a false declaration, which caused the court to assume erroneously that the state was not sitting idly by. The court expressed its strong disapproval. Not only were the promises made during the hearings in this matter not upheld, but the non-compliance was accompanied by a "zigzag" of claims by the State Attorney's Office, which, following a series of undertakings before the court, changed its tune and presented a totally new argument that in fact negated the previous commitments. The results of this conduct were the court was misled, the proceedings were extended for an unreasonable time, and what the court itself referred to as "a waste of the court's time". The commitments made apparently served as "tools" for the government in order to "gain time" and

were in fact an exploitation of the court to enable the government's continuing unlawful behaviour. The court stated in this regard that:

> "It must be noted that the employment arrangements that were meant to be implemented appeared to be solid fact, but not only has none of their provisions been implemented, but it is also possible that some are now seeking to re-examine their very justification. That was not the consistent position that the state presented to this court, and I find it difficult to accept. What is this if not a waste of the court's time and of the many hearings that were held on this petition on the arguments surrounding the question of new employment arrangements? Moreover, as I noted, these arrangements were used as the foundation of the previous ruling rendered and its conclusion that, despite the failure to solve the issue of binding workers, the respondents would not sit idly by but would act to implement these arrangements... All we can do is to advise the respondents of the great gravity of this conduct, which is unacceptable..."

4) **HCJ 8414/05, Yassin v. The Government of Israel,** concerns the matter of the separation barrier in the area of Bil'in. Here, the state violated its express undertaking to ensure the villagers' free passage to their land in the northern section of the separation barrier. Furthermore, representatives of the State Attorney's Office, according to the court's decision, did not inform the court of the failure to do so, a fact for which the court reprimanded it seriously (in an interim order). It should be noted in passing that the ruling given in September 2007 in this case has not been implemented to date. The court instructed the state to divert the course of the separation barrier, but the separation barrier remains unlawfully positioned on the land to this day. In the meantime, the court ordered the state to pay costs in two petitions, under a contempt of court order, that were filed after the ruling was delivered.

5) In the case of **A.A. 1613-08**, **Naim Abd al-Latif Abd al-Rahim Abd al-Hay v. The Israel Land Administration**, Tel Aviv District, an appeal under the Freedom of Information Law, after detailing the unfolding of events in the appeal, Justice Dr. M. Agmon-Gonen held as follows:

> "In my decision of 13 April 2009, I instructed the respondent to announce within 30 days whether the Administration possesses the information... the respondent has not yet responded. I am allowing the respondent a further 14-day period to answer. In the event that the respondent fails to do so, and if it transpires that the deliberations were superfluous, then the respondent will bear the costs.
>
> The respondent did not respond to this decision either, and on 13 July 2010 the petitioner's counsel requested a ruling, in view of the fact that the respondent had not upheld the decisions of the court. In my decision of 20 July 2010, I allowed the respondent 30 days in which to respond. Again, the respondent failed to do so, and on 2 January 2011 another petition for a ruling was filed.

> This has indeed been disrespect of the highest order for a decision of the court on the respondent's part over a period of almost two years. Accordingly – and after the respondent was shown leniency and given countless opportunities to respond – concerns arise over whether the respondent is evading the need to respond to the court's decision and to the petitioner.
>
> Thus I hereby give a ruling ordering the respondent to provide the petitioner with the details within 30 days... together with an affidavit authenticating the information provided. In view of the recurring requests made of the petitioner's counsel, and in view of the respondent's indifference to the court's decisions, I order the respondent to pay costs of the petition in the sum of NIS 35,000. This amount will bear linkage differentials and interest, as lawfully required, from today until payment de facto."

I note that the Israel Land Administration was represented in this appeal by the Tel Aviv District Attorney. The disrespect, as the court termed it, has been ongoing for close to two years.

6) **HCJ 2759/09, Head of the Labum Village Council v. The Minister of Defence et al., i**n the matter of the road between the outpost of Givat HaYovel and the settlement of Eli. The road passes through land privately owned by Palestinians from the village of Karyut. In 2009, the Yesh Din Association filed a petition on the landowners' behalf. The court issued an interim injunction/order, but it transpired that the order was violated and the road was paved. The petitioners reported this fact to the State Attorney's Office, which confirmed to the petitioners that the order had indeed been violated but did not see fit to report the violation to the court. Instead, it partially excavated channels in the road, and in fact admitted that the government did not intend to implement the demolition order, because, as it argued, the road was the sole route leading to the outpost. Furthermore, the Attorney General asked for the petition to be withdrawn. It also transpired that the photographs which the state had submitted to the court were not up-to-date, and that the state had not conducted observations that could have exposed the violation. The court scathingly criticised the Attorney General's position, stating that:

> "On the face of things, it seems that the continuing paving works near the outpost were completed after the interim order was given in this matter, and, if this is indeed the case, we see it as extremely grave. It also transpires that the aerial photographs which were submitted to us do not reflect the present state of affairs in the area" (decision dated 26 May 2009).

7) **HCJ 4475/09, Salman Wahlima v. The Minister of Defence et al.** (ruling dated 18 August 2009): A petition by the head of the councils of Deir Istiya and [Kafr] Thulth (with the assistance of Yesh Din) was filed against the law

enforcement authorities for their failure to implement the planning and building laws regarding a building under construction in the illegal outpost of Almatan. When the petition was filed, the building was under construction. The court issued an interim order that became a permanent order on 16 June 2009 prohibiting construction from continuing. Construction continued in violation of the interim order, and the completed building meanwhile served as a synagogue for residents of the outpost. When the petitioners reported the violation to the Attorney General, he stated that the judicial order had indeed been violated and that the state intended to seal and fence off the synagogue, in order to prevent the continuing violation. Following these undertakings, the High Court of Justice gave an order instructing the state to notify it within 60 days of whether the building had been sealed up. The government refrained from sealing up the building because of a petition filed by the Committee of Shomron Settlers against the decision to seal the building. This petition was rejected and the petitioners were ordered to pay costs because of the lack of integrity of the petition. The court again ordered the government to do so, but the building was not sealed. When the Attorney General's Office was asked to explain why it had not been sealed up, it relied on a new petition, this time filed by a member of the congregation of the synagogue, who argued that a hearing must be held before the building was sealed, and asked for an interim order against the sealing operation. The Attorney General's opinion was that there was no room for such a hearing, but he adopted the position that if the court instructed it, then the state would not object to holding a hearing. The court rejected the petition and requested an interim order, holding that the state would act as it deemed fit. Sixty days later, the Attorney General informed the court that it had decided to grant a hearing to the congregant, that it would be held in one week's time, and requested a further extension of two weeks.

I note that the position of the Attorney General, who decided to allow a hearing pertaining to the duty to enforce a court order, is in itself highly surprising.

8) **HCJ 9669/10, Abd al-Rahman Qasem Abd al-Rahman v. The Minister of Defence et al**: This petition was submitted by Yesh Din on behalf of a Palestinian from the village of Dura al-Qarra against the construction of several buildings near [the settlement of] Beit El, which were built on the appellant's land that was seized in the 1970s for security purposes, and in spite of demolition orders issued by the Civil Administration. In a discussion held on 24 January 2011, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Justice stated, "The magic word is priorities... but no priorities are ever applied. Where are the priorities that you cite each week? You say that you are planning to demolish, but you have done nothing." She added, "We have given interim orders and they are violated to enable this construction to continue, in contradiction of what you say," and, "We are studying many similar cases, and with all the declarations about enforcement priorities, we have not seen the orders being implemented in any of the cases. There are no priorities because nothing is happening". Justice Hanan Meltzer added, "You constantly use the word 'priorities' and it may be the case that you lack sufficient

enforcement resources, or budgetary allocations and personnel. But you must make this known. When resources are lacking, it is apparently possible to demolish one house per year. You issue orders but no one takes any notice of them, and neither do you. Your answer is always that it is a matter of priorities. It is unacceptable and it is not an answer. Provide exact details." He continued, "In Beit El there was a temporary injunction and an interim injunction… Should this not have been given priority? Because there was also a stop-work order? ... You issue orders and everyone ignores them, and you yourselves ignore them."

Ultimately the court placed an active obligation on the government to ensure that construction of the buildings ceased, and to ascertain that they would not be occupied. In other words, the court instructed the government to enforce the orders that it itself issued. To the best of my knowledge, construction is continuing as of the time of writing, and so on 10 March 2011 an application for an order was filed, under the contempt of court order, against the state authorities.

9) The matter of **HCJ 5023/08, Shehadeh et al. v. The Minister of Defence et al**. concerns the building of nine houses in Ofra on land that is registered and privately owned by Palestinian residents. The government announced its intention "to conclude the matter, with God's help" within 60 days. Following numerous ups and downs, the Minister of Defence advised the court that the fate of the homes in Ofra would be determined together with that of the whole of Ofra; that is, within the framework of the permanent agreements. Under the interim order issued in the case (in July 2008), construction of the homes and their occupation was prohibited, as well as '"any use of them". When the petitioners turned to the Attorney General's Office to request enforcement of the order, to include the prohibition of "any use of the buildings", the Attorney General replied that, according to his understanding, it was only the respondents whom were prohibited from using the buildings; that is, Defence Minister Ehud Barak and then-Commander of Central Command, Gadi Shamni.

10) **HCJ 8887/06, Yousef Mousa Abdel Razek el-Nabut et al. v. The Minister of Defence et al.** This petition concerns the outpost of Migron. There was a concrete undertaking by the government, made to the High Court of Justice, to evacuate the outpost by August 2008. When that date elapsed and nothing had happened, the state informed the court that houses and neighbourhoods would first be built for the settlers of Migron, and only then would the outpost be evacuated.

11) **HCJ 5488/04, The al-Ram Local Council et al., v. The Government of Israel et al.** (ruling dated 13 December 2006). This appeal concerns the route of the Separation Barrier in the area of al-Ram and the crossing arrangements at the Qalandiya checkpoint. It was filed to enable a reasonable fabric of life for residents of East Jerusalem who remained in neighbourhoods on the other side of the barrier. The High Court of Justice rejected the appeal, and this with explicit reliance on the state's undertaking to put in place

regular crossing arrangements, as detailed in the government's announcement of 2 May 2006. The court held in its ruling that – based on the state's undertaking – the petitioners had a "reasonable mechanism of access to Jerusalem", and that its decision was based on the assumption that Israeli residents living in al-Ram had reasonable access to Jerusalem, as well as the assumption that the residents' fabric of life would be preserved by means of appropriate arrangements. In fact, construction of a public traffic route, planned to enable reasonable crossing arrangements, was only carried out four years later, in mid-2010. Moreover, due to personnel problems in the Israeli army, it opened only in December 2010 (and this after repeated requests from the Association of Civil Rights in Israel). Although there has recently been an improvement in the crossing arrangements, not all the provisions or the spirit of the state's undertaking have been fully implemented.

12) **HCJ 6193/05, Residents' Council of Ras Khamis et al. v. The Competent Authority under the Arrangement of Seized Land Law – 1949, et al.** (ruling dated 25 November 2008). This appeal was filed in the matter of the route of the separation barrier in the Shuafat area. The respondents' position was that the chief means to avoid cutting off the residents of the Shuafat ridge from Jerusalem was the crossing terminal to be constructed in the western part of the route. The respondents stated before the court that, according to the plans, the terminal would operate around the clock and would allow thousands of people to cross it every day. The court held that constructing the barrier impeded the residents of the Shuafat ridge, including those who are permanent residents of Israel, from crossing over to their workplaces, services, education and social centres and from accessing municipal services, most of which are located elsewhere in Jerusalem. The court added that the barrier impeded free access from those neighbourhoods to clinics and hospitals in other parts of Jerusalem, to schools, and to various governmental offices. It stood to impact substantially on the way of life of permanent residents residing in the Shuafat ridge, and adversely affect the performance of simple, everyday activities. However, the court continued:

> "Taking into account the commitments of the state, first and foremost its commitment to construct a crossing terminal in the area, it seems possible – and also an obligation – to reduce much of the harm to a level that makes possible a continued routine way of life in the neighbourhoods of the Shuafat ridge… The planned crossing terminal, as described in the respondents' announcement of 20 August 2007, with all the means included therein to ensure crossing between the Shuafat ridge and the other neighbourhoods of Jerusalem, is intended to prevent the isolation of the appellants from the urban centre to which they belong".

The court therefore held that:

> "…taking into account the decision of the Appeals Committee requiring the state to construct the crossing terminal in a manner

> that permits the passage of 5,000 people per hour during peak hours (06:00-08:00), to ensure short and reasonable waiting-times at the checkpoint, our conclusion is that the harm caused to the appellants is proportional as regards the need to achieve the goals of security that underlie the route of the barrier."

A letter from the Association for Civil Rights in Israel dated 7 December 2010 reveals that there have recently been more cases of closure of the Shuafat checkpoint, which serves tens of thousand of people, many of them residents of Jerusalem. It is closed for many hours on end, or for entire nights. Closing the checkpoint is in total contravention of the state's aforementioned undertaking to operate the checkpoint around the clock, on the basis of which the route of the barrier was approved.

13) **HCJ 6773/05, Ali Afnan v. The Ministry of Education** (ruling dated 3 January 2006). A ruling in the case [brought by Adalah] was given on the basis of the state's commitment to pave a safe access road from the junction at the entrance to the village of Al-Fur'a in the Negev to the school. This commitment was in order to enable schoolchildren to arrive at school safely. It has not yet been implemented.

14) **HCJ 10026/01, Adalah v. The Prime Minister of Israel** (ruling dated 2 April 2003). This petition seeks the appointment of directors from the Arab population to the boards of government corporations – both women and men – in view of legislative amendments made to the Government Corporations Law concerning appropriate representation. The appeal was rejected on various grounds, but in the ruling the court noted that the state had declared that it would act to increase the representation of Arabs. To date these declarations have not been implemented in practice. The pace of appointments is slow, almost negligible. (According to information that I received from Adalah, as of 2009 and the proportion of Jewish women on boards of directors of state corporations stood at nearly 30% of all directors, compared to the proportion of Arab men for that year, at 5.26%, and that of Arab women, at 2.71%.).

15) Another example relevant to the matter concerns the state's failure to comply with policy declarations made before the courts. It pertains to a policy that the government announced to the court regarding the forcible transfer of Palestinians to the Gaza Strip on the basis of their addresses. In this matter, Advocate Elad Kahana of HaMoked: Centre for the Defence of the Individual wrote to the Director of the Supreme Court Department [in the Attorney General's Office] as early as 19 July 2010. However, to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Kahana has not received a reply. (The most recent reminder was sent on 14 February 2011.) I do not intend to enter into the details of the matter at hand, which is described clearly and at length in the letter sent by HaMoked. The letter states that the army is operating in total contravention of, and in a substantively different manner from, the policy that the state presented to the High Court of Justice. It is acting, in contravention of that policy, to transfer Palestinians to the Gaza Strip forcibly, and after the fact

disregards the policy and refuses to enable those who have been expelled to return to their places of residence. The letter also states that the IDF has developed a procedure that contravenes the stated policy and emphasises that, "the declarations that were given to the High Court of Justice as part of the judicial proceeding are legally valid and also meant to bind all the authorities. The fact that the military agencies totally ignore these declarations, or attempt to evade them, is a substantively invalid act that arouses concern over its effect on the rule of law." (In the absence of a response, it is unclear whether any changes have taken place in the field following the letter.)

6. To summarise – I would like to close with the story from different times, a story with a moral. The caption of the story is **HCJ J217/79, Abu Keren Sliman v. The Israel Lands Administration – Southern District, the Minister of Finance, Maatz, the Minister of Housing and Construction, the Local Committee for Planning and Construction, the Israel Police, the Minister of the Interior, et al.**

   This is the story. It was 1979, and the Deputy Attorney General declared to the High Court of Justice that the respondents would not seize the land that was the subject of deliberation other than by court order. The respondents violated this undertaking and brought in heavy machinery to parts of the area in question, with which they destroyed tree fencing. Following an appeal, the Attorney General informed the court that the respondents recognised the fact that, in view of the undertaking by the Deputy Attorney General, there was no justification for seizing the land or carrying out any form of work prior to the provision of a court order. The Attorney General agreed that the order nisi would be absolute, and the state undertook to pay compensation to the petitioner, and set the amount of the damages consensually. Attached to the Attorney General's statement was an accounting of the steps that would be taken in order to investigate the conduct of state employees in the matter. The Attorney General announced that he would be launching disciplinary proceedings at the National Labour Court into some of the employees.

   Of this, the court stated (in its decision on 25 April 1979):

   > "It is our duty to express to the Attorney General our deep appreciation for his thorough work and serious attitude. This court has always seen the Attorney General as a loyal partner in the task of upholding the law of the state. The matter before us proves that the Attorney General has also understood his role, and was not deterred by any steps, and has brought the truth to light. And for this the court conveys its gratitude".

Indeed, those were the days.

7. I would appreciate it if you would see it fit to make the amendment required by Directive no. 6.1006, and also to set up a database in order to implement the directive, to include the details of rulings, interim decisions and orders of the courts, as well as records of any commitments and declarations made by the Attorney General's Office to the courts. This database should be updated regularly. In this way

the State Attorney will be a loyal partner in the court's task of upholding the law of the state, and you will receive the gratitude of the court, and my own small gratitude.

Yours sincerely,
Yehudit Karp

cc: The Minister of Justice
The Ombudsman