

Men Under the Military Regime

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Our man, our leader was Abu Hamdi (the *mukhtar*). If we wanted something, we would go to him, he never let us down.

This was Abu Isma'il's response when I asked him about his understanding of the ideal man, during an interview about the period of the military regime. Abu Isma'il's response was not exceptional in comparison to others who lived during the first two decades of the establishment of the state of Israel. This is so despite the fact that the interview was held forty years after these events first took place.

Abu Isma'il's response characterizes the *mukhtar* (local village leader – in Arabic, “the chosen”) as the ideal man, the man able to fulfill the daily needs of the people. However, military regime files disclose the various functions of the *mukhtar*. As General Avner describes in a pamphlet that he issued to the military governors on 28 January 1949, the *mukhtar* was to:¹

strive for peace in the village and report to the military governor's representative with information regarding absentee property, infiltrators, armed men, men in the possession of any ammunition or other military equipment, crimes, accidents, or instances of unnatural death.

The *mukhtar* was appointed by the authorities rather than chosen by the population who he administered. As the above citation indicates, the *mukhtar*'s role was to implement Israeli security laws and subjugate the Palestinian minority, a community whose members had become Israeli citizens. By definition, the *mukhtar*'s interests were those of the military regime and principally, its security. In what sense then was this figure “our man, our leader”?

Addressing this or any question on Palestinian masculinity after the 1948 war requires

elaborating on the state's security-related legal practices, as well as the ways in which these practices informed the construction and articulation of masculine identity and conceptions. This discussion will cover the historical period from 1948 until 1966 that witnessed the establishment of the state and the imposition of a military regime on the Palestinian minority. It will attempt to interrogate the affectivity of these practices, as well as the masculinity constructed during this historical epoch, in reshaping family relationships and the role of women.

This article contends that security-related legal practices severed Palestinian conceptions of masculinity. Palestinian masculinity was confined to the man's capacity to provide for his family's subsistence needs (housing, food, drink). This ultimately led to the absence of the public sphere in Palestinian constructions of masculinity, as would be anticipated under a shadow of national oppression. Masculinity was linked to the patient endurance of pain and physical suffering that men withstood during the military regime. Endurance was defined not by the struggle for emancipation as much as by the battle for daily sustenance. Palestinian masculinity was distinguished by avoiding confrontation with the authorities, similar to the euphemism that “the runaway is a third of a man.” Masculine identity did not simply change men's relationship to their families and wives but reformulated them altogether. Conservative traditions regarding a woman's societal role were revived and the figure of the sacrificing woman, especially the widow raising her orphaned children, was reinforced as a social norm.

This article constitutes an initial attempt to research the implications of the military regime on masculine identities. Support for its main

argument is based on interviews with a small group of men from a Palestinian village in Israel. These men are from one social segment and from one age group. They are part of a generation that was in its youth during the military regime. Conclusive evidence of men's lives under the shadow of the military regime is not presented here. Rather, this article attempts to convince the reader, through the analysis of the fervent voices heard in the interviews and in the literature, that the masculinity of Palestinians remaining in their country after 1948 was impacted by the state's security-related legal practices. The aim then is to point out a complex reality without claiming to present sharply delineated results or characteristics.

A cursory presentation of masculine identity and gender studies opens this discussion. Some military regime project objectives are then elucidated, including the subjugation of Arab inhabitants through the control of their movement and the monitoring of them with the help of a network of informants. The article points out the effectiveness of this project in the delineation of the Palestinian man's subjectivity, his understanding of the status that he holds in the state, and his internalization of being a monitored and criminalized subject. The construction of masculinity in other oppressive contexts is then reviewed to integrate a comparative perspective. A few formations of Palestinian masculinity resulting from the military regime's security practices are also analyzed. The article concludes with a brief analysis of marital and familial relations.

The study of male gender identity was set in motion by the feminist movement and feminist studies.² Social science, similar to the natural sciences, had predominantly confined its scholarship to the study of the male, effectively

deeming women as "other." Mainstream social science considered man not as a social construct but rather as a representative of humanity in general.³ Such scholarship has been sorely mistaken in its assumption of arriving at scientific conclusions on humanity in general, while basing its research on one social grouping with specific social and biological characteristics. Such research erased one group to the benefit of the other. The lion's share of scholarship and knowledge was devoted to the man whose body, experience, and specific narrative were considered the normative standard.

Feminist studies initiated the interrogation of masculinity (and femininity) as social constructs. These efforts explored the construction and conceptualization of male subjectivity as well as how social structures and power relations delineated the "essence" of man. This research addressed questions such as: Do patriarchal social structures benefit the man? Or do such structures impose on the male, himself an "other," a discursive set of practices and behaviors, which are reinforced by social structures and apparatuses? Does such discourse and its formulation in praxis delineate "man" as it does "woman"?

When gender identity is dealt with as a social construct, masculinity and femininity are not understood as objects of study but rather as social and cultural processes in which men and women live gendered lives. It is impossible, moreover, to understand this identity without recognizing its intersections with class, race, nationalism, and location in the world order.⁴ Thus, the study of gender identity requires addressing the social context from which it arises. Social contexts are in turn constituted by specific historical, political, juridical, and cultural trajectories.

The Project and Its Personalities

The context of Palestinian masculinity, addressed here, is one of political subjugation and coercion through which Palestinian citizens of Israel experience an internal colonization.⁵ This is particularly true of the period of military regime (1948-1966). Any simple investigation will expose the ways in which state practices, during the first two decades of its establishment, crudely violated the most basic human rights, individually and collectively, of Palestinians in Israel.

The state's security-related legal practices made daily sustenance the main sphere of struggle. The state actualized this transformation through the authoritarian monitoring of every aspect of Palestinian life in Israel. Legal infrastructure facilitated state practice during this period, lending it "legitimacy" on the one hand, and preventing any opposition on the other.

The military regime apparatus operated through the military governor, an official who was the representative of the government before the Palestinian inhabitants. His role was to coordinate the activities of various government offices in the realm of politics, economy, and security. Formally, the role of the military governor ended at the professional specializations that government employees were assigned to administer. However, in practice, there was no separation between professional and security realms. In addition to the military regime apparatus, other security forces operated: the police force and the General Security Services.⁶ Through a set of administrative decisions, the military governor became the sole connection between state offices and Arab inhabitants.

Oral accounts of this period, absent from state

documents, convey the harsh experience of life under the military regime. They demonstrate the extent to which the security apparatus moved beyond the mere regulation of the Palestinian's relationship to the state and well into the structuring of his daily life, the absolute control over his body, and often the determination of his children's futures. Abu Mahmud recounted:⁷

I remember that when we needed a permit to take our sons to the doctor, not even to work to get food or drink, we would go twice, three times, five times to the neighboring village to get a permit. We didn't have any way to get there. Some of us barely had a donkey. The woman used to carry the child with her husband in front or behind her. Everyone would wait next to so-and-so's house, and if we were lucky we would get our turn and if not, we had no hope. Sometimes they would give us one permit for five people. Say for example one of us had to go the north and the other to the south, and if the policeman caught us, what would we say to him?

Even a morsel of bread was at times a source of prolonged suffering. As Abu Salim says:

For a period of time, there was a shortage of bread and we were forced to go to the neighboring Jewish villages or to Haifa to buy bread. We used to send the women, because if women were stopped by the police, they would be let free if they threw the bread away, but the men, they threw the men in jail.

Various security measures and policies were implemented during the military regime. Usually the military regime authorities executed these measures; any other state intervention worked in full coordination with the regime's apparatus. Security policies aimed at maintaining the status quo by prohibiting Palestinians from returning to their lands, refusing them access to refugees'

properties, and restricting their movement and forcing them to carry an identity card at all times or risk the charge of infiltration.⁸

The state legislated new laws enabling it to confiscate lands and properties of both absentees and present residents.⁹ However, the parallel, but no less harsh, confinement of Palestinians' daily movement did not require new legislation. The emergency regulations proclaimed during the Mandate period provided the basis for the military regime apparatus. These legal practices, which determined every aspect of individual life, were decided upon by administrative bodies without previous judicial approval. Occasionally, the military leadership staffed all such administrative bodies, and the military governor himself was appointed by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense.¹⁰

Alina Korn points out that during this period, the state initiated an instrumental use of law and criminalization both to monitor and to politically control the Palestinian minority.¹¹ However, it is possible to further argue that Palestinians withstanding this type of subjugation internalized their criminalization, in some cases believing themselves guilty of infractions and offenses.¹²

Abu Isma'il said: "The judge would ask if we were guilty, and we would say guilty, since they caught us," meaning that the policeman had seen them working in Tel Aviv without a permit. The very term "caught" indicates Abu Isma'il's understanding that his behavior is criminal. For example, when I asked Abu Yusef for an interview, his friends in the elderly home teased him about his words being recorded. He responded that "it doesn't matter, I'm not going to be extreme." Abu Yusef seems to assume that his behavior in the interview could be understood as extremist. Another man

explained: "They didn't forbid giving permits, except to those with prior convictions." When I asked what he meant by "prior convictions," he replied, "Violating the law, like working without a permit." Thus, the very terms "prior conviction," "violating the laws," and "working without a permit" take on an entire lexicon of criminality.

One of the men I interviewed asked not to be recorded. He said: "The texts you write, I can always deny but how can I deny my own voice?" Does this sentence reflect a perception that law does not allow for the narration of history? Does it demonstrate that until today people continue to perceive the law from the perspective of the military regime's coercion? Or does the authority of the military regime continue to persist on one level or another?

The above-mentioned practices of oppressive legislation, Mandate-era emergency regulations, and military regime methods all worked in parallel in semi-authoritarian ways to coercively monitor the smallest detail of Palestinian daily life. The military regime authorities did not act alone in the process of maintaining "security" by denying people their daily sustenance and monitoring their every movement. The formal apparatus employed local agents to implement these policies, and of these figures, the *mukhtar* was the most prominent. As previously mentioned, the *mukhtar's* collaboration with the military regime authorities was an essential element of his job description. The authorities also enlisted other residents as informants, who were sometimes known and at other times unknown. The policy of "the carrot and the stick" was followed with these informants. Abu Hassan told me: "Some people who had *protectzia* [he used the Hebrew word] used to take work permits for a month rather than a

week.” When I asked him who were these people with *protectzia*, he responded: “Those who are connected to the authority, the *mukhtar* and others.” He also said:

When the military governor took my identity card and accused me of going to the Arab areas – that’s what we used to call the West Bank – he said, “Go take it from the Military Regime Center at five o’clock in the afternoon.” Because I didn’t go to the Center, he contacted one of my acquaintances in the village. When I went to him he asked: “Why didn’t you say you were from such and such family?” So I replied to him: “It says on my identity card and you know that,” so he responded that he would return my identity card to me and said that he wanted me to work with them because I was smart. He asked me to arrest five people who smuggled goods from the Arab areas, and he named them.

Abu Hassan’s story is not unique; it is rather representative of the military regime’s methods. An initial analysis demonstrates that the “carrot” promised to most people was not an offer of a leisurely life but rather the giving of basic needs and rights – such as returning an identity card or granting permission to work. Informants were charged with providing information not simply on those opposing the military, but also on who went to work and where, or who went to the West Bank to buy sugar and rice to provide for his family.

Subjugation and Masculinity

The impact of military regime policies on the construction of Palestinian masculinity has not been studied. There are, however, some scholars who have dealt with other cases of masculinity in oppressive contexts. Whether local or international, these contexts are distinguished by

a national or racial group practicing physical and discursive power on an “other.” These studies are useful in situating and conceptualizing the topic at hand.

In the context of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Julie Peteet demonstrates the occupying state’s role in reformulating Palestinian masculinity after the first Intifada. Peteet contends that the methods of the occupation, in particular, the capturing of defenseless Palestinian youth for torture and beating at the hands of armed soldiers, transformed what was understood as the abasement of masculinity to a rite of passage, or an initiation to manliness.¹³ The scars and marks of torture on the body became symbols of Palestinian steadfastness in the face of the occupier. Peteet points out the parallel phenomenon of the rise in the social standing of youth. Traditional norms privilege elderly men as the representative figures of the community; their age is an attribute of both social status and masculinity. However, after the first Intifada, elderly men lost a measure of their social place to young men. This was due to the elder’s inability to physically confront the occupation forces. The heightened status of young men, especially those tortured in Israeli prisons, was reflected in their participation in contexts such as family reconciliation (*sulha*). It is important to note that other studies have pointed to contradictory results. Ronit Lentin, for example, argues that the humiliation inflicted upon Palestinians at the hands of the occupying powers violates masculinity rather than enriching it.¹⁴ In my opinion, these contradictions do not indicate faulty research. They point rather to the possibility of more than one discourse on masculinity in the same context. That is, masculinity can have a plurality

of coexisting references despite the presence of a singular hegemonic discourse.¹⁵

Daniel Boyarin similarly contends that Zionism for Freud, Herzl, and Nordo was a project that redeemed “the defeated manliness” of the Jews in Germany.¹⁶ Therein, the Aryan ideologues perceived Jews as feminine, Eastern, and debased. For Freud and Nordo, Zionism was a remedy for the gender defective Jew. According to Boyarin, Freud and Nordo internalized the Aryan conception of a mutilated Jewish masculinity in a highly dysfunctional manner. Indeed, he argues that the establishment of a Zionist project was their attempt to reformulate normative masculinity based on the “ideal” Aryan male. Boyarin suggests a similar argument for Herzl, who considered Jews an average class incapable of being accepted into the ranks of the Christian elite.

Literary critic George Tarabishi makes similar claims in his analysis of the contemporary Arabic novel.¹⁷ Tarabishi argues that Western colonialism resulted in the transformation of the Arab intellectual’s self image when he internalized his “inferiority” in the face of the Westerner. The power relations between colonizer/colonized and East/West with their bases in force, control, and scrutiny resulted in a reformulation of masculinity. The Arab intellectual, he argues, began conceptualizing any sort of cultural exchange as a relationship between a man and a woman, that is, a relationship based on submissiveness and suffering. It was in his relationship to and with women that the Arab intellectual compensated for his perceived inferiority in the face of Western culture. That is, the Eastern man who understood himself as suffering from a cultural curse redeemed himself through his sexual prowess. In his relationship to women, the Arab

intellectual mimicked the power relations between colonized and colonizer. This tendency also expressed itself in the Arab male relationship to the white woman, who he perceived as an object upon which to evidence his masculinity.

The Heroics of Our Leader/Our Man

Despite the latter two scholars’ focus on an elite stratum, all four of these scholars do much to demonstrate the deep impact of political, legal, cultural, and social power on constructions and conceptualizations of masculinity. This scholarship provides a useful point of departure. The remainder of this article will attempt to elucidate some aspects of masculine identity among Palestinian citizens in Israel, and the ways in which the military regime’s security-related legal practices impacted its construction.

As discussed above, the battle for daily sustenance became the primary domain of struggle and resistance as opposed to the struggle for freedom, the return of confiscated land, or the demand for political and civic rights.¹⁸ Remaining in the country became in and of itself a measure of steadfastness. The ideal normative man was one who could provide for his family, build a house, and marry off his children. It is in this manner that the public sphere was erased from conceptualizations of masculinity, as was the struggle for national rights. For example, Abu Mazen said:

The best man is the one who preserves his family’s honor, loves people, doesn’t do bad things, helps those in need, and it doesn’t matter what is his position. The important thing is that he is able to build a family from the sweat of his brow, rather than the selling of lands.¹⁹

Abu Salim said:

The ideal man is the one who cares for himself and his family, carries out his obligations to God and His creation, cares for the house and the children, fasts and prays, worships God and pleases his people.

Abu Rabi' said:

Thank God and God's grace, I was independent in all circumstances and never needed anybody.

A limited number of interviews clearly revealed that the models for heroic masculinity were concretely derived from the family or village. There is no mention of a political, historic, or even mythical figure. At the same time, masculinity became defined by physical heroics in the face of a harsh reality and the struggle for daily sustenance. The withstanding of physical exhaustion and painful difficulties became a source of pride. Thus, masculine heroism was derived from the provision of daily sustenance and not from the resistance against humiliation and subjugation. The emergency regulations and the military regime structure succeeded in subjugating the body of the Palestinian man and excluding him from the public sphere. All of his aspirations were thus confined to the private sphere. The military regime's security-related practices rendered the private sphere a refuge from intense scrutiny. Through continuous monitoring and subjugation, these laws erased any sort of individual agency in the public sphere. If at any point the public sphere was a site of masculine heroism, it was only in the sense of maintaining the private sphere and not in challenging any structural inequality.

Some men said:

In the beginning we didn't have work permits, so we used to go to the neighboring Jewish village.

We worked for pennies and slept in orange groves over the land and under the sky. Write that down, under the sky and over the land. It was difficult to get blankets from the Red Cross. Sometimes the mosquitoes would enter our bodies through the blankets. When a policeman came we would run away and "not all pitfalls are easy."

We built this state. We built Tel Aviv on our shoulders. We worked in construction. We would carry the donkey to the third floor, and we were no better than the donkeys. We were little children and we used to work without permits. Swear to God, we built Dizengoff on our shoulders.

We used to use the shoe for a pillow, and the bags of cement for a mattress.

Once I was hauling concrete barefoot and when the Jewish man saw me, he gave me a raise.

These accounts were mentioned by the men who I interviewed in the context of discussing the harsh realities and difficulties of meeting their families' daily needs. However, they also bring to light different dimensions of conceptions of masculinity, that is the suffering, pain, and sacrifice required for basic survival.

When the discussion turns to the man's relationship to the military regime apparatus, masculinity gains additional meanings. Manliness is herein defined by the man's capacity to avoid confrontation with the authorities, and a number of articulations are used to justify this need. Two contradictory discourses function simultaneously – either masculinity is employed to justify the subjugated position, or the same position is justified as "there is no power and no strength save in God."

Abu Rabi' describes the military governor

who walked to his work in 'Ara and forced anyone in his way to stop out of respect; those who did not comply were beaten by him. Abu Rabi' says that he used to flee the military governor's path, explaining that he didn't want to be stopped but that he also wanted to avoid any confrontation with the military governor. Abu Rabi' quoted the saying: "I never tried myself in war, but in fleeing I am as fast as a deer." On land confiscation, Abu Rabi' commented: "To whom would you raise your complaint when your enemy is the judge?" And we also hear: "The man who doesn't see through the sieve is blind." And others said: "That's how everyone was," and "The hand that you can't overcome kiss," as well as "All of us were without power and strength."

We can thus return to the subject with which we began this article, that is, the role of the *mukhtar*'s persona in shaping masculine identities during the military regime. The *mukhtar* did not necessarily constitute an ideal role model for all men. At the same time, he was not disparaged but rather he was an accepted figure. The position of the *mukhtar* reflects the crisis of masculinity among Palestinians in Israel. Despite the fact that people understood that the *mukhtar*'s role was to serve the military authorities, and despite their awareness of what this authority stood for, the *mukhtar* remained a model of the man who was able to fulfill people's needs. Palestinians thus perceived, and continue to perceive, the *mukhtar* in a contradictory manner. The *mukhtar* represents both the power denied the inhabitants and the mediator that rescues them from direct confrontation with the state. We find the same person simultaneously condemning informants and collaborators and taking pride in his good relationship or familial connection with the *mukhtar*.

Abu Isma'il, who cited the *mukhtar* as the ideal man, also pointed out how the *mukhtar*, based on the informants' reports, would tax anyone who owned more than one cow or goat. The people, therefore, according to Abu Isma'il, considered the informants to be traitors. However, when I asked Abu Isma'il in another context about his relationship to the *mukhtar*, he responded in a proud voice: "Like gold, my aunt, my brother's sister, was married to the *mukhtar*'s father."

The *mukhtar* thus simultaneously represents the rule of security legalities and embodies the mediating channel with these very legalities, enabling people, in some cases, to avoid direct confrontation with the law. The *mukhtar* both enforces the law through his surveillance of the population and provides access to the law by facilitating the issuance of work permits. The *mukhtar*, the embodiment of "security" laws, coerces the man in the public sphere and facilitates his confinement to the private sphere, making men's struggle for daily sustenance possible. Of particular use here is the definition of law, especially security law, as a system that produces, constructs, organizes, and administers social relations, rather than one that protects basic freedom and rights.²⁰ Drawing on such a definition of law, the *mukhtar* appears at once as the oppressor of man and a party to his production. In other words, the *mukhtar*/law's oppression of the Palestinian man is the very force that produces him.

Our Leader's Family

The military regime's security practices were not limited to the construction of Palestinian masculinity but also influenced family structure, the social status of women, as well as men's

relationship to women. Nahla 'Abdo argues, for example, that the process of land confiscation led to a shift in reliance on the individual, as opposed to the familial economy.²¹ Therefore, the man was no longer dependent on his family and could live alone. Indeed, his father became dependent on him. One would expect to come to certain conclusions about social transformations to individualism as well as the decreased status of the elderly. Yet the contrary is true. 'Abdo shows that the Palestinian family lost its productive role on the one hand, while reviving its reproductive role on the other. The man's position was transformed from a worker in the family economy to a laborer in the Israeli economy, whereas the woman's economic role as a worker was diminished but her reproductive role was enhanced.

Abu Mazen ascertains the family's social significance despite the man's dispossession as a landowner:

The son wouldn't intrude on his father's conversation, except in a polite and respectful way. Even after we became workers, when we lost our lands, we gave our salaries to our father. In my case, for example, I didn't have a father so I gave my salary to my mother. She was responsible for us until my brothers got married.

A clear consensus emerged from these interviews on the ideal woman. Such a woman would care for her children, maintain her "honor," and protect her reputation. She was typically a widow or a woman with an absent husband. Feminist scholarship has dealt with three characteristics of the ideal woman: maternity, sacrifice and suffering, and the maintenance of "honor." A fourth characteristic, in my opinion, was a product of the military regime. During this period, as mentioned above, the economic

significance of the extended family was atomized. Thus, the widowed woman became the main provider for her nuclear family. Since the majority of women no longer worked in agriculture, as they did before 1948, the widow was forced to work outside the familial context and often with strangers. The woman was ascribed a high social status, despite the fact that this type of labor was traditionally associated with masculinity. This social standing was conferred on women only in cases of a husband's death or absence; otherwise, labor outside the home was disgraceful for the woman and her husband.

Abu Isma'il discusses the ideal woman:

I remember some women in the village who were widows. They raised their children and they did hard work. For example, I know one woman whose husband was killed in 1948. She had two sons and a daughter. With difficulty, she raised them and they became men. She had a good reputation, she preserved her honor; no one could touch her with a bad word.

Whereas Abu Mazen said:

My mother is the ideal woman. Her husband left and she had six boys. She worked in the orange grove and she did not reject any job. She took care of us until we became men.

Additionally, we witness some transformations in social practices under the military regime. The very concept of honor took on an extremely conservative meaning, unknown to peasants before 1948. One man interviewed said:

Women [before 1948] used to work in sowing and harvesting. The harvesting was women's work, and it used to be done at night. Everything was safe; people did not question one another. The plough worker used to go with the women and to sleep

next to them on the same mattress under the same blanket. Can you believe it? No one said a word! Today, if a man and a woman are alone everyone questions them. It was better in the old days.

The economic, political, and security transformations that the Palestinians experienced under the military regime isolated them from their lands and deprived them of work. As ‘Abdo asserts, these transformations led to the revival of “traditional” practices, including the construct of “honor.”²² The focus on and the reinvigoration of the notion of “honor” reflects the fact that women’s behavior became the only site of male control in Palestinian society. Moreover, as Manar Hassan demonstrates in her study of “honor killings” in a more recent period, the state had a direct role in reviving and reformulating traditional practices.²³ By encouraging traditional structures and invigorating the function and power of both the *makhatir* (*mukhtars*) and large families, the state played a significant role in the reformulation of Palestinian social norms.

Conclusion

The modes of Palestinian praxis during the military regime remain a closed file, in need of candid scholarship despite the pain, shame, and fear it may inspire. This historical epoch remains unspoken and un-researched by the people who experienced it. This article is a starting point for further research and a contribution to the analysis of one implication of Israeli legal practices on the construction of Palestinian masculine identity. Understanding this identity requires moving beyond the impact of Israeli legal practices and dealing with the various other aspects that contributed to its construction. For,

the impact of the military regime has certainly outlived the historical epoch itself, as the very category of the “Arab in Israel” was actualized during that period, and this “Arab” continues to accompany us today.

End Notes

- 1 As quoted by Alina Korn, *Crime, Political Status and Law Enforcement: The Israeli Arab Population During the Military Government (1948-1966)* (Thesis Submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree, Hebrew University, 1997) at 56 (Hebrew).
- 2 R.W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) at 24.
- 3 For a discussion from a psychological perspective, see Lynn Hankin Nelson, "Who Knows? What Can They Know? And When?" in *Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy*, eds. Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (New York and London: Routledge, 1996) at 286-297.
- 4 R.W. Connell, *supra* note 2, at 71, 75.
- 5 Elia Zuriek, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
- 6 A. Korn, *supra* note 1, at 54.
- 7 The names of the men interviewed have been changed.
- 8 A. Korn, *supra* note 1, at 64.
- 9 David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) at 49-76.
- 10 *Id.* at 142.
- 11 A. Korn, *supra* note 1, at 194.
- 12 Austin Sarat, "Pain, Powerlessness, and the Promises of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: An Idiosyncratic, Autobiographical Account of Conflict and Continuity," 18 *Windsor Year Book of Access to Justice* 187 (2000).
- 13 Julie Peteet, "Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian Intifada: A Cultural Politics of Violence," in *Imagined Masculinities*, eds. Mai Ghoussoub and Emma Sinclair-Webb (London: Saqi Books, 2000) at 103-126.
- 14 Ronit Lentin, "Women, War and Peace in a Culture of Violence: The Middle East and Northern Ireland," in *Women and the Politics of Peace*, eds. Rada Boric and Casic Biljana (Zagreb, Serbia, forthcoming), as quoted in Hanna Herzog, "Homefront and Battlefield and the Status of Jewish and Palestinian Women in Israel," 3(1) *Israel Studies* 61 (1998).
- 15 Orna Sason-Levy, *Construction of Gender Identities in the Israeli Army* (Thesis Submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree, Hebrew University, 1997) at 8 (Hebrew).
- 16 Daniel Boyarin, "Colonial Drag: Zionism, Gender and Mimicry," 11 *Theory and Criticism* 123 (Winter 1997) (Hebrew).
- 17 George Tarabishi, *East and West, Masculinity and Femininity: A Study in the Crisis of Sexuality and Culture in the Arabic Novel* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1997) (Arabic).
- 18 Some of the people I interviewed mentioned the mood and psychological state of the military governor or official influencing their treatment of individuals.
- 19 The reference here is to the sale of lands to other villagers. Land dispossession and land administration, on the other hand, is not seen as a deprivation of masculinity. There is no shame in having your lands confiscated by the state, but rather in selling lands even to a relative or another resident of the village.
- 20 A. Sarat, *supra* note 12, at 198-199.
- 21 Nahla Abdo, *Family, Women and Social Change in the Middle East: The Palestinian Case* (Toronto: Canadian Scholar Press, 1987) at 29-30.
- 22 *Id.* at 38.
- 23 Manar Hasan, "The Politics of Honor: Patriarchy, the State and Murder of Women in Palestinian Society in Israel in the Name of Family Honor," *Sex, Gender and Politics*, eds. Dafna Izraeli, Ariella Friedman, Henriette Dahan-Kalev, Hanna Herzog, Manar Hasan, Hannah Naveh, and Silvie Fogiel-Bijaoui (Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Hameuchad, 1999) at 267-305 (Hebrew). See also N. Abdo, *supra* note 21, at 35-36.