Unofficial translation by Adalah of excerpts from the State's response to petition 41922-01-2025
Original Hebrew response is available here

In the Supreme Court **HCJ 41992-01-2025**
Sitting as the High Court of Justice

1. **Shaher Alqam**
2. **Samar Al-Halikaoui**
3. **Iman Al-Haroub**
4. **Basma Mahfouz**
5. **Mohammed Ma'amar**
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The Petitioners

Against

1. **The Knesset**

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2. **The Minister of Defense**
3. **The Military Commander of the West Bank**
4. **The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories**
5. **The Attorney General**

Respondents 2-5 represented by the HCJ department, State Attorney's Office
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Tel: 073-3925590; Fax: 02-646

The Respondents

Response on behalf of Respondents 2-5 to the request for an interim injunction

4. The respondents will argue that the petitioners' request for an interim injunction should be rejected on several independent grounds, and particularly given their cumulative weight.

First, the laws challenged in the petition, like any piece of primary legislation, benefit from the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption, which derives its normative force from the principle of the separation of powers, prescribes that the Honorable Court does not grant interim injunctions aimed at preventing the entry into force of primary legislation except in the rarest of cases. The respondents' position is that this is not one of those exceptional cases and that there is no justification for judicial intervention in the primary legislation of the Knesset.

Second, the respondents will also refer to the provisions set forth in the UNRWA Laws, which were passed by the Knesset plenary by a significant majority of approximately 90 MKs [members of Knesset], which stipulate that the laws will take effect three months from the date of their publication. The legislator thus considered the need for preparation time to find alternatives to UNRWA's operations and to allow UNRWA itself time to prepare, ultimately deciding on a three-month transition period. In effect, the petitioners are asking the Honorable Court to step into the shoes of the legislator and determine an additional preparatory period. Moreover, granting the requested interim injunction would, in practice, amount to an order altering the existing legal status, constituting direct judicial intervention in primary Knesset legislation regarding the commencement provisions of the UNRWA Laws, which set a defined three-month preparatory period before the laws take effect.

Third, the respondents will argue that both the relative harm to each party and the likelihood of the petition's success weigh against granting the injunction. Regarding potential harm, the respondents contend that the petitioners' arguments of "severe and irreversible damage" are insufficiently substantiated and do not correspond to the various measures being taken by state authorities to find alternatives to UNRWA's operations, where necessary, in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. The respondents will elaborate on these measures and demonstrate that, contrary to the petitioners' assertions, Israel is preparing for the laws' entry into force in a manner that is expected to address a significant portion of the concerns raised in the petition. Furthermore, a considerable number of the petitioners' arguments pertain to issues of implementation, which would be more appropriately challenged through targeted administrative petitions rather than through a broad and sweeping interim injunction delaying the entry into force of primary legislation enacted by the Knesset.

Therefore, the respondents will argue that the request for an interim injunction should be rejected.

[...]

8. Over the years, various testimonies have accumulated in Israel regarding the involvement of terrorist operatives within UNRWA and the misuse of its facilities. These testimonies were

significantly reinforced following the terrorist attack launched by the terrorist organization Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip on 7 October 2023 and during the "Iron Swords" war that broke out following this horrific attack. [...]

10. [...] Against this backdrop, since the beginning of 2024, and even before the laws that are the subject of this petition were enacted, the [Israeli] government has pursued a policy to reduce UNRWA's operations in the Gaza Strip, while encouraging the involvement of other international actors, with the long-term goal of replacing UNRWA entirely and halt its operations. Among other measures, steps have been taken to reduce contributions to UNRWA from leading donor countries and redirect them to other organizations; efforts are underway to find alternatives to the services provided by UNRWA in the Gaza Strip, as well as to encourage the involvement of other international actors. Since the beginning of the war, a broad humanitarian network has been operating in the Gaza Strip, including a variety of humanitarian organizations, such as UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and states. Israel is collaborating with dozens of organizations that have expanded their activities and demonstrated an ability to provide large-scale humanitarian aid, facilitating and easing the entry of humanitarian assistance for the civilian population.

[...]

34. Since the enactment of the UNRWA Laws, and even prior to it, several government ministries and other authorities have made intensive efforts to establish alternatives to UNRWA's operations in various sectors. These efforts involve, among others, the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Jerusalem Affairs and Heritage (hereinafter: Ministry of Jerusalem), the National Security Council (hereinafter: NSC), the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Israel Tax Authority, and the Municipality of Jerusalem.

35. Even before the passage of the laws, Government Decision No. 1839 was adopted on 5 June 2024, regarding "Providing Alternative Solutions for the Services Provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the City of Jerusalem" (hereinafter: Government Decision No. 1839). As part of this Government Decision, it was decided "to instruct the Ministry of Jerusalem to act in accordance with the implementation of Decision 880, its objectives, its implementation mechanisms, and its budgets to provide alternative solutions for the services provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in East Jerusalem, including in the fields of health and education, with the agreement of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education, each within its respective field."

[...]

Following this Government Decision [No. 1839], and certainly after the legislation of the UNRWA laws, preparatory work was carried out at the Ministry of Jerusalem to provide alternatives to the core services provided by UNRWA in East Jerusalem. We will elaborate on this below, within the discussion on the balance of convenience [a legal concept primarily used in the context of assessing interim injunctions under Israeli law, which involves determining which party would suffer greater harm if the requested relief were granted or denied] in favor of rejecting the request for an interim injunction.

36. On 13 January 2025, the political leadership organized a political consultation, chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by the Minister of Defense, the Minister for Strategic Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Cabinet Secretary, in preparation for the entry into force of the UNRWA laws. At the conclusion of the consultation, directives were given, including concerning the preparation of the relevant bodies to implement the laws and find solutions and alternatives for the activities of the Agency. It should be clarified that the position of the political leadership is that the entry into force of the UNRWA laws should not be delayed, but rather that all bodies should work to prepare for their entry into force and, after this date, fully implement them.

37. It should also be noted that, on 20 January 2025, a confidential discussion was held in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on "Monitoring the Implementation of the UNRWA Laws." During the discussion, government ministries and other relevant entities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Jerusalem, the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Jerusalem Municipality, and the Customs Authority, presented their preparations for implementing the UNRWA laws.

38. Additionally, a discussion was held on 22 January 2025, led by the Cabinet Secretary and attended by relevant government entities, addressed, among other matters, the preparedness of the relevant bodies for the entry into force of the UNRWA laws. It should also be noted that, at the request of the Chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the NSC approached relevant public sector entities on 23 January 2025, requesting, as a matter of urgency and no later than 27 January 2025, details of any gaps in the implementation of the UNRWA laws that they believe should be brought before the committee.

[...]

44. The respondents' position is that the request for an interim injunction should be denied, as there is no basis for granting such an exceptionally rare remedy—namely, suspending the entry into force of primary legislation enacted by the Knesset. This is particularly true given that the UNRWA laws explicitly stipulate a three-months' delay in their entry into force from the date of their publication, meaning that granting the requested injunction would, in effect, constitute a mandatory order altering the legal status quo. The respondents will further argue that neither the prospects of the petition nor the "balance of convenience" justify granting the far-reaching interim injunction sought.

[...]

52. The UNRWA laws concern clear-cut political and security matters, including Israel's relationship to the United Nations. Confronting the issue directly, the petitioners ask this Honorable Court to intervene in the Israeli Knesset's decision to sever ties with UNRWA and in the government's policy on these matters. In other words, the remedy sought in the petition aims to alter Israel's foreign policy, which is a highly complex and sensitive issue, by coercing state authorities to maintain diplomatic relations with UNRWA.

Therefore, the legislation that is the subject of this petition pertains to complex political affairs, and, as a general rule, judicial intervention in such matters is limited and confined to rare and exceptional cases, as this Honorable Court has previously ruled [...]

53. In this context, it should be clarified that the UNRWA laws not only reflect the will of the Knesset as the legislative authority in Israel, but also the position of the political leadership. These issues are deeply rooted in the broad discretion of the executive branch [...]

This is the case where the matter involves primary Knesset legislation and an issue related to Israel's foreign policy, and given the limited scope of judicial intervention in such cases – particularly when dealing with clear-cut political matters – the respondents argue that the chances of success in the petition are low and do not justify the issuance of an interim injunction to suspend the entry into force of the legislation in question.

[...]

57. Finally, the respondents will argue that the assessment of the "balance of convenience" between the parties also favors rejecting the request for an interim injunction. Regarding the "balance of convenience," the petitioners primarily argue that the entry into force of the UNRWA laws on 30 January 2025 will have immediate implications for a large number of residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza; that delaying this request could render the petition's substance irrelevant; and that the harm anticipated from delaying the laws' entry into force is relatively minimal.

58. To address the petitioners' arguments, an account will be provided of the actions taken by various government ministries in preparation for the entry into force of the UNRWA laws. This will also include a response to the petitioners' arguments regarding the harm that they assert will result from the implementation of the laws. In this context, the respondents will argue that, contrary to the petitioners' assertions, the entry into force of the UNRWA laws does not have an immediate or irreversible impact on the petitioners or on the 2.5 million other residents the petitioners claim will be harmed.

For the sake of convenience, the response will be organized according to the three distinct areas in which the petitioners have focused their arguments and where UNRWA operates—East Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], and the Gaza Strip.

59. Before addressing the matter further, it is worth noting that many of the arguments raised in the petition relate to concrete issues at the regional level and in the administrative-individual context. For example, the petitioners' argument regarding street cleaning in East Jerusalem, as well as arguments concerning the operation of two specific health service stations in the area, are not suited to examination within the framework of a constitutional petition, but rather to resolution within the scope of administrative petitions. In practice, not only do these arguments relate to the regional-administrative level, but they also do not, in themselves, establish grounds for judicial intervention in primary legislation enacted by the Knesset, let alone for the issuance of an interim injunction that would delay the implementation of such legislation. In this context, it should be noted that, as established in the extensive case law of this Honorable Court, generally, when there is an administrative solution available, the constitutional avenue should not be pursued, and judicial intervention should be considered only as a last resort. [...]

The petitioners' arguments regarding East Jerusalem and the response to them

60. Regarding UNRWA's activities in East Jerusalem, the petitioners primarily argue that UNRWA provides a range of services to the local population, including healthcare, education, and sanitation services. In this context, it is argued that the Agency operates several clinics in the area, including child clinics, as well as schools that serve a significant number of students.

61. At the outset, it should be clarified that the State of Israel is working to provide civil services, including education and healthcare, to the population of East Jerusalem residents. As will be detailed below, the State of Israel intends to expand the scope and variety of services provided to the population in the eastern part of the city.

[...]

63. As stated, the Ministry of Jerusalem began the process of advancing relevant alternatives approximately six months ago. This included data collection, which involved requests by the Ministry for information from various government ministries regarding services known to be provided by UNRWA in the eastern [part of the] city and cross-checking this information with the data published by UNRWA. Based on the information collected, the various needs were mapped out, and a work plan was developed in collaboration with the relevant government ministries and the Municipality of Jerusalem, based on the needs identified. Subsequently, a public consultation team was established to refine the alternative services to be provided based on the needs of the local population.

    The team is made up of experts with many years of experience and extensive familiarity with the area and communities in East Jerusalem, both inside and outside the barrier. After the team was recruited, an operational work plan was developed on the subject. A communications framework was also defined to convey the alternatives to the population, which includes creating a dedicated website for residents and media outreach in various channels directed at the residents of East Jerusalem. Currently, the public consultation team is working on establishing several communication tools in the media and on social networks to provide comprehensive information about the alternatives proposed by the Israeli authorities, highlighting the advantages and improvements compared to UNRWA's existing services.

64. Regarding the education sector in East Jerusalem, discussions were held with the Ministry of Education, which revealed that UNRWA operates several schools in the area:

    a. A girls' school in Silwan, with 140 students in grades 1-9.
    b. A girls' school in Sur Baher, with 110 students in grades 1-9.
    c. A boys' school in Wadi Joz, with 76 students in grades 1-9.
    d. Two elementary schools and one middle school in the Shu'afat Refugee Camp, with 190 boys and 250 girls in grades 1-9 [1-5, 6-10].
    e. A boys' school in Kufr 'Aqab, with 350 students (12 of whom hold residency status), in grades 9-12.

    It is worth noting that data from the Ministry of Jerusalem indicates a significant decline in the number of students enrolled in UNRWA schools in East Jerusalem over the years. In 1989, 2,875

students were enrolled in UNRWA institutions in Jerusalem; in 2018, approximately 1,800 students; and in 2023, only 776 students were enrolled. According to the respondents, those who left UNRWA schools have transferred to recognized and official educational institutions.

65. Based on the above, an immediate-term solution was formulated, which includes preparations for the placement of all students at various schools throughout Jerusalem. The Ministry of Education established criteria for student placement, which formed the basis for the alternative placement plan. These criteria include, among other factors:

Priority for placement in official schools (and if no space is available, students may be referred to 'recognized but unofficial' institutions).

Priority for placement within existing schools in students' residential neighborhoods (if placement outside these neighborhoods is required, transportation will be offered to parents).

Maximizing the use of available classrooms while ensuring full class capacity.

Additionally, it was agreed that the purchase of equipment, transportation services, and any other necessary arrangements for the immediate placement of students will be funded under Government Decision 880 and carried out by the Municipality of Jerusalem .

[...]

68. Additionally, ahead of the school year 5786 [the 2025–2026 school year], the Ministry of Education is working to establish a school in the area of Herod's Gate and to reopen the middle school in the Ras al-'Amoud neighborhood to accommodate students and help reduce overcrowding in neighboring areas.

69. The Ministry of Jerusalem also stated that a school for approximately 650 students residing in the Shu'afat neighborhood will be established within eight months from the date the law takes effect, by placing temporary structures at a location designated by the Jerusalem Municipality and the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education will recruit educational staff for this institution. The school's establishment will be funded under Government Decision 880 and implemented by the Municipality of Jerusalem.

The Ministry of Jerusalem further stated that the permanent solution for this population, as well as for the thousands of students who have already transferred to official educational institutions, is the establishment of an educational campus that will accommodate approximately 2,000 students residing in the Shu'afat neighborhood, and the ministry has already allocated around 20 million shekels for the preparation of the land as part of the five-year plan under Government Decision 880. Additionally, the ministry is working to advance the establishment of an educational campus in Kufr 'Aqab to address emerging needs in the area.

70. Thus, the Ministry of Jerusalem, in coordination with the Ministry of Education and the Jerusalem Municipality, are prepared to provide an organized and structured educational solution for all students of UNRWA schools in East Jerusalem, who will be able to enroll in alternative schools should UNRWA institutions in East Jerusalem close.

71. With regard to **healthcare in East Jerusalem**, discussions held by the Jerusalem Ministry with the Ministry of Health and the Jerusalem Municipality indicate that UNRWA has provided services to residents in two medical facilities:

a. The Herod's Gate Clinic – "Tipat Halav" [Mother and Child Clinic]: A review conducted by the public consultation team and the Ministry of Health suggests that the services provided at this clinic can, in principle, be offered at other clinics.
b. Clinic in the Shu'afat neighborhood – Dental Care and "Tipat Halav": Seemingly, this clinic provides free dental care; however, dental services are already included in the Israeli healthcare basket for specific age groups and additional populations based on medical conditions.

It is estimated that approximately 2,000 infants receive care at these two clinics. It should be noted that the "Tipat Halav" services provided at UNRWA clinics constitute primary healthcare and do not offer the full range of services available at "Tipat Halav" clinics in Israel.

72. It should be noted that, according to an inquiry conducted by the Ministry of Health, UNRWA chose to close the "Tipat Halav" clinic in Shu'afat at its own initiative, prior to the legislation of the laws and without relation to them. It should also be noted that a petition regarding the Tipat Halav services in Shu'afat is currently pending before the Honorable Court (HCJ 7566/21), in which the state has committed to taking steps to establish a Tipat Halav clinic in the area. However, the case is still pending. Additionally, a tender was issued for the operation of the clinic, with the organization "Al-Mustashfá al Hilāl al Aḩmar" [the Red Crescent Hospital] being selected as the winner. The winner was notified of the results, but the agreement has not yet been signed, and in any case, the service has not yet been provided, since essential preparatory steps are yet to be completed, including obtaining the required insurance approvals. Furthermore, as part of the five-year plan, a multi-purpose building is expected to be established that will also provide healthcare services to residents of the neighborhood.

73. With regard to the "Tipat Halav" clinic at Herod's Gate, officials from the Ministry of Health have stated that, should it be closed, there are sufficient alternatives within reasonable proximity for residents of the area who are eligible for healthcare services under the National Health Insurance Law, 1994 (hereinafter: **the National Health Insurance Law)**. It should also be noted that vaccinations provided by UNRWA clinics in East Jerusalem are included in the services provided by the Israeli healthcare system (which also includes additional vaccinations), meaning that there is already an alternative response to the services provided by UNRWA.

74. It should also be noted that, according to the Ministry of Jerusalem , a budget of approximately

3.5 million NIS has been approved from the funds allocated under Government Decision 880 for the expansion of healthcare services and "Tipat Halav" services at various health centers in neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The enhancement of services will begin immediately after the cessation of UNRWA's operations in East Jerusalem. [...]

75. Additionally, according to the Ministry of Health, both the Ministry and Israeli health clinics do not purchase services from the medical units operated by UNRWA. Furthermore, the medical services provided by UNRWA to eligible individuals generally exceed those included in the healthcare available to Israeli residents covered under the National Health Insurance Law. Therefore, even if these services are discontinued in the future, in most cases, it will not affect entitlements outlined in the law.

76. Regarding sanitation and waste management in East Jerusalem, as in all parts of the city, the responsibility falls under the Municipality of Jerusalem. It should be noted that, in recent years, the municipality has allocated significant resources to improve sanitation across the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, including cleaning and waste removal in the Shu'afat refugee camp.

<u>The petitioners' arguments regarding Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] and the response to them</u>

77. Regarding UNRWA's activities in Judea and Samaria, the petitioners' main arguments focus on the civil services provided by UNRWA, which they argue are extensive and cover various areas. Among other things, they argue that the cessation of UNRWA's operations in Judea and Samaria would have an immediate detrimental impact on the health of the Palestinian residents living there, as UNRWA is said to operate approximately 40 medical centers in the region (paragraph 30 of the petition). Additionally, the petitioners argue that UNRWA runs a large number of educational institutions in Judea and Samaria, which provide services to around 45,000 students, and also employs a significant number of teaching staff. Finally, the petitioners assert that UNRWA operates a range of programs aimed at assisting disadvantaged populations in Judea and Samaria, as well as a social safety net that assists approximately 20,000 residents.

78. UNRWA's involvement in Judea and Samaria is focused on various civilian areas, such as education and healthcare. In this context, it is important to emphasize that, in accordance with the "Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (hereinafter: **the Interim Agreement**) [Oslo II Accord], which was incorporated into regional law through the Proclamation on the Implementation of the Interim Agreement (Judea and Samaria) (No. 7), 1995, **<u>responsibility for these areas in Judea and Samaria was transferred to the Palestinian Authority.</u>**

It should further be clarified that, according to the Interim Agreement, responsibility for these areas was delegated to the Palestinian Authority not only with respect to Areas A and B, but also with respect to the Palestinian population residing in Area C. In other words, all Palestinian residents of Judea and Samaria fall under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority in terms

of education and healthcare, whether they attend schools operated by UNRWA or other schools—private or public. As a matter of course, the UNRWA laws do not address the relations or cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and local UNRWA employees.

79. Additionally, the assessment of the experts in the Civil Administration is that no direct impact is expected on the **humanitarian** situation in Judea and Samaria as a result of the laws' coming into effect or of the severing of contact between the Civil Administration and the Agency.

80. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, since the beginning of the "Iron Swords" war, there has been a significant reduction in direct working relationships between the Civil Administration authorities in Judea and Samaria and UNRWA representatives in the region. Under these circumstances, it seems that the law will not have a significant impact on the services that UNRWA provides to Palestinian residents in Judea and Samaria, as these services have already been in operation in 2024, prior to the laws' coming into effect.

81. To provide a full picture, it should be noted that, during the first half of 2023, UNRWA employees went on strike in the area, and, according to the Civil Administration authorities, this did not have a dramatic impact on the humanitarian situation in the areas where UNRWA focuses its operations or on the region as a whole. The most noticeable impact of the strike was the widespread shutdown of the schools operated by the organization.

82. Regarding **the education sector in Judea and Samaria,** it should be noted that approximately 47,000 students are enrolled in UNRWA-operated educational institutions in 96 schools; this is, compared to around 792,000 students in total attending 2,428 Palestinian Authority schools (less than 6% of the total students in Judea and Samaria, and about 4% of the total number of schools). Additionally, of approximately 50,000 teaching staff in Judea and Samaria, fewer than 2,000 employees work in UNRWA institutions.

    It should be emphasized, as stated by the Civil Administration officials, that teachers, students, and infrastructure in educational institutions will be able to continue working, subject to the decision of the relevant Palestinian Authority authorities, who are responsible for the operation, funding, and supervision of these institutions, in accordance with the Interim Agreement.

83. Regarding healthcare in Judea and Samaria, according to the Ministry of Health, it has not had direct contact with UNRWA or its employees for several months, even prior to the enactment of the laws. Moreover, as mentioned, the ministry believes that the responsibility for the health of residents in Judea and Samaria lies with the Palestinian Authority, and the services it provides are adequate. Therefore, at face value, no change is expected in the situation with the entry into force of the laws, pertaining to the connection between UNRWA and the Ministry of Health, which further justifies rejecting the request for an interim injunction.

84. Regarding the importing of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals to Israel, in general the

importing of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals requires submission of a request and approval by the relevant authorities in the Ministry of Health and the Tax Authority. According to officials in the Ministry of Health, import requests for medicines and equipment are submitted by various customs brokers, directly on behalf of UNRWA. In this context, it should be noted that the Tax Authority has stated that, according to Section 2 of the Law for the Cessation of UNRWA Activities, the Customs Department will no longer be able to inspect UNRWA's import declarations after the law comes into effect. Therefore, UNRWA will not be able to import goods to Israel or the Palestinian Authority in the manner that was allowed before the law's entry into force. Additionally, the Tax Authority will not be able to examine requests from UNRWA for exemptions or refunds from other indirect taxes due to the prohibition on contact with UNRWA.

85. UNRWA operates 42 clinics and one medical institution defined as a hospital (in Qalqilya) in Judea and Samaria. According to the Ministry of Health, the scope of healthcare services provided by UNRWA is limited compared to those offered by the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, even if these services are discontinued in the future, the Palestinian Authority provides an adequate alternative, meaning there is no necessity for the continuation of these services, as they have a replacement.

<u>The petitioners' arguments regarding the Gaza Strip and the response to them</u>

86. Regarding the Gaza Strip, the petitioners primarily argue that UNRWA provides extensive and significant humanitarian aid to its residents. In this context, they argue that during the "Iron Swords" war, the Agency provided shelter to residents of the Strip. Additionally, the petitioners assert that UNRWA delivers essential healthcare services, including the provision of medications, vaccinations for the residents, and comprehensive medical consultations. The Agency also plays a key role in the entry and distribution of food and humanitarian aid to the Strip's residents. Furthermore, the petitioners state that UNRWA operates 284 schools in the Gaza Strip, attended by 294,086 students, and provides vocational training programs as well as scholarships for higher education.

87. Indeed, as reported by officials at the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), UNRWA is currently responsible for distributing food to some of the residents of the Gaza Strip, including those residing in the Agency's shelter facilities and their surroundings. It should be noted that, at present and following the ceasefire, some shelters have begun to be evacuated as residents return to their homes, and, according to a professional assessment by COGAT, many more are expected to return to their homes as the population continues to return to the northern part of the Strip. Additionally, it should be noted that UNRWA is currently operating 8 clinics and 54 medical stations in the Gaza Strip; however, it does not operate hospitals. It provides limited support for water supply in the Strip (1-3 percent) and offers sanitation services, including waste removal in various areas of the Strip. UNRWA is also involved in the logistical network, including collecting and transporting aid within the Strip.

It should also be noted that many aspects of the tactical coordination of the activities of various UN agencies within the Strip are carried out in coordination with a UN entity that is not

UNRWA, which oversees all UN humanitarian activities. As necessary, the responding authorities will continue to engage in tactical coordination with the coordinating entity regarding the overall activities of UN agencies in the Gaza Strip.

88. Additionally, and as detailed below, the primary response to the petitioners' arguments is the increase in the activities and entry of other aid agencies that are not involved in terrorism and will provide the necessary response—particularly in terms of humanitarian aid.

89. In accordance with the UNRWA laws, after 30 January 2025, no humanitarian aid from UNRWA is expected to enter the Gaza Strip. Accordingly, the professional assessment is that the number of aid trucks entering the Strip daily from UN agencies will decrease by approximately 100 trucks.

However, although the total number of trucks from UN agencies is expected to decrease, the updated assessment from officials at COGAT indicates that the activities of other aid organizations are expected to allow for the provision of the required humanitarian assistance in line with the ceasefire framework.

Regarding fuel, until recently UNRWA was involved in the transportation, storage, and distribution of all fuel to humanitarian facilities in the Gaza Strip. However, the entire sector has recently been transferred to another UN agency.

[...]

92. Therefore, in light of all the above, the respondents argue that the request for an interim injunction should be rejected.

[...]